We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks and of the characteristics of the concession contracts themselves.
Introduction
The large privatization-liberalization-deregulation wave started in England in the eighties quickly reached Latin America 1 . To provide wide access to the major public services such as electricity, gas, water, telecommunications and transportation, a lot of hope was put in conceding management to private operators through concession contracts with or without bidding procedures.
However, it soon appeared that concession contracts were plagued with a large number of renegotiations. In Latin America and the Caribbean countries in the 1990s, about 40% on average were renegotiated, and the average time to renegotiate turned out to be surprisingly short, around 2.2 years (Guasch, 2001 ).
The procurement and regulation literature 2 has been written for developed countries in which the quality of institutions yields a level of enforcement of contracts so high that renegotiations can be considered as a second order phenomenon. On the contrary, for LDCs it appears that renegotiation is an important phenomenon calling for both theoretical and empirical analysis.
Imperfect enforcement leading to renegotiations is a major characteristic of LDCs which must be understood to provide a useful theoretical framework for procurement policy and regulation. This has been emphasized by the 2001 World Development Report (World Bank, 2001) , which stresses that "there is a growing consensus that regulation, particularly in poor countries, must be designed with an appreciation of both information asymmetries and difficulties of enforcement".
The literature on regulation and procurement contracts has dealt with asymmetric information within the framework of mechanism design and complete contracts. Then, renegotiation never happens. If the regulator cannot commit not to renegotiate (Dewatripont (1986) ) the optimal contract suffers from the ratchet effect, but is still renegotiation-proof (Hart and Tirole (1988) , Laffont and Tirole (1990) ). Indeed, optimal contracting commits to ex post inefficiencies to mitigate the costs of information rents. Any limitation of commitment yields potential renegotiation which can be anticipated in the initial contract; then, the anticipated outcome of renegotiation can be embedded in the initial contract which becomes renegotiation-proof, so that no renegotiation occurs along the equilibrium path. The analysis has been extended to cases where some contractual variables require costly auditing (Baron and Besanko (1984) , Laffont and Tirole (1993) , Khalil (1992) ). Auditing of effort levels or states of nature is incorporated into the contracts but does not yield renegotiation.
When can we have actual renegotiations? One way is to postulate that initial contracts are incomplete (Hart and Moore (1988) , Green and Laffont (1992) , Aghion et alii (1994) , Segal and Whinston (2002) ). The reasons invoked for these contractual incompletenesses are contractual transaction costs difficult to pin down, bounded rationality of players which are rarely explicitly modeled or some imperfections of the judicial system, which are assumed in a rather ad hoc way.
Modeling more precisely the imperfections of the judicial system is certainly the most promising path in our state of knowledge. One simple way is to observe that many contracts call for ex post penalties and to stress the imperfection of the enforcement of those penalties.
3 Bondt (2002) constructs a moral hazard model with ex post penalties which may not be enforced because of side-contracting between judges and the contractual party which must be punished. Anderlini et alii (2000) instead consider incomplete contracts so that ex post judges who maximize social welfare may be willing to void some clauses, and this could lead to renegotiations. Laffont (2000) , Laffont and Meleu (2001) offer procurement and regulation models with adverse selection where imperfect enforcement of penalties can be affected by expenditures in enforcement very much in the black box tradition of the Chicago school.
In Section 2 of this paper, we extend this theoretical framework to account for a maximal number of realistic characteristics of concession contracts and for exogenous shocks. This will provide us with a whole set of predictions for the probabilities of renegotiation of concession contracts.
Then, Section 3 examines a data set of nearly 1000 concessions awarded in Latin America and Caribbean countries from 1982 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport and water, and analyzes the renegotiation of these contracts. First, we construct country rates of renegotiation and examine the temporal evolution of these rates and how it depends on the regulatory institutions, institutional features and economic shocks.
Next, we complement this first approach by a probit panel analysis which enables us to take full advantage of the information embedded in individual observations, such as the age of each specific contract or its power of incentives. The empirical analysis performed provides a broad support to the predictions derived from the theoretical model.
In the concluding section, we derive some policy implications of our theoretical and 3 The importance of enforcement of laws was stressed by the Chicago school (see Becker (1968) , Stigler (1970) , Becker and Stigler (1974) , Posner (1972) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for a recent synthesis), but has been little addressed by modern contract theory. empirical work.
The Model

Optimal Regulation
Consider the concession of a natural monopoly with, in addition to a necessary sunk investment, or fixed cost, F , which is common knowledge, has a variable cost function:
where q is the production level, β is an adverse selection parameter in β, β with ν = Pr β = β and e is a moral hazard variable which decreases cost, but creates to the manager a disutility Ψ (e) with Ψ > 0, Ψ > 0, Ψ ≥ 0.
Consumers derive utility S (q), S > 0, S < 0 from the consumption of the natural monopoly's good. Let p (.) be the inverse demand function andt the transfer from the regulator to the firm. The firm's net utility writes:
We assume that cost is ex post observable by the regulator as well as the price and the quantity. So we can make the accounting assumption that revenues and cost are incurred by the regulator, who pays a net transfer t =t + p(q)q − (β − e)q − F . Accordingly, the participation constraint of the firm can be written:
where we make use of (1) to substitute e by β − c, with c = C q .
To finance the transfert, the government must raise taxes with a price of public funds 1 + λ, λ > 0. Hence, consumers' net utility is:
Utilitarian social welfare is then given by the sum of consumers' surplus and the firm utility, here with equal weight of 1 for both:
This implies that the government values the rent of the firm as much as consumers' utility, which may not be realistic when the awarded concessionaire is a foreign firm. The key feature, however, is that the regulator dislikes leaving a rent to the firm, which occurs as long as the weight of its rent is lower that 1 + λ. In subsequent sections, we analyze the effects of making this weight vary.
Under complete information, the maximization of social welfare would lead to 4 :
Ψ (e * ) = q * (7)
We denote q * , e * , U * and q * , e * , U * the solutions corresponding to β and β respectively.
Since consumers equate their marginal utility to the price (S (q) = p), equation (6), which says that social marginal utility equals social marginal cost, can be rewritten as a Lerner index formula:
where η (p) is the price elasticity of demand. The price is then between the marginal cost (β − e) and the monopoly price p M defined by
The marginal disutility of effort Ψ (e) is equated to its marginal social gain q, and no rent is given up to the firm because funds are socially costly (λ > 0).
Suppose now that the regulator cannot observe the effort level e and does not know β. However, he can offer a contract to the firm before the latter discovers its type (see Figure 1 for the timing).
E
Time
The regulator offers the regulatory contract
The firm accepts or not the contract The firm discovers its type β Production and transfer take place
Figure 1:
Timing Equation (3) shows that the observability of cost reduces the problem to a simple adverse selection problem. From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to direct revelation mechanisms (t, c) , t, c which specify for each messageβ = β orβ = β an average cost to achieve and a net transfer from the regulator. The regulatory contract also recommends a production level q (or q) and a total cost C (or C), compatible with c (or c) (between which the firm is indifferent) which maximize expected social welfare.
However, the direct revelation mechanism must be truthful, i.e., must satisfy the incentive constraints
These constraints can be rewritten:
where
Since the firm must accept or reject the contract before it knows its type, its participation constraint must be written ex ante:
Finally, the regulator's maximization program becomes:
It is more transparent to rewrite this program in terms of the variables (q, e, U ) rather than (q, c, U ). Let us also denote W (q, e, β) the complete information ex post social welfare for a production level q and an effort level e when the efficiency parameter is β, i.e.:
The regulator's program rewrites:
The regulator makes the participation constraint binding and, substituting in the objective function, maximizes social welfare 5 . For each value of β he finds the complete information optimum. There are many pairs of transfers that structure the rents in such a way that the incentive constraints are satisfied. By making (11) binding, we get:
and
By making (12) binding, we get instead:
⇔ t = Ψ (e) − νΦ (e + ∆β) .
Any value of t, t between those obtained in ( (16), (18)) and ( (20), (22)) would work. The main point to notice is that the inefficient type β's ex post utility is always negative and this loss is minimized when (11) is binding 6 .
This negative ex post utility raises the issue of enforcement. Indeed, once it discovers its type β the firm would like to renege on the regulatory contract. In a country with strong institutions, the contract is enforced in both states of nature β and β. As a consequence, asymmetric information does not create any transaction cost for society and the complete information optimal allocation is achieved despite the setting of incomplete information.
At the other extreme, suppose that the regulator anticipates that he will not be able to enforce a negative ex post utility level for the firm. Then, he will choose a regulatory contract which maximizes expected social welfare under the incentive constraints, but also the ex post participation constraints:
The set of constraints is the same as if the contract was offered to the firm at the interim stage, i.e. once the firm knows its type. We know that in this case the efficient type's incentive constraint (11) and the inefficient type's participation constraint (24) will be the binding ones. Substituting into the objective function of the regulator and maximizing, we obtain:
and the same pricing equations as under complete information 7 . Now, the efficient type captures a positive rent, and to decrease somewhat this socially costly rent the regulator decreases the effort level in the case β = β. However, the efficient type's effort level is not distorted.
The loss in expected social welfare due to the extreme weakness of enforcement institutions and the need to rely on self-enforcing contracts is:
where the first term on the right hand side is the Rent Loss and the second one is the Efficiency Loss.
Imperfect Enforcement
We want to model more precisely what happens when institutions ensure only an imperfect enforcement of regulatory contracts.
We will assume that when the firm obtains an ex post negative utility, it attempts to renegotiate its regulatory contract 8 . However, with a probability π (x), the regulator is able nevertheless to impose the implementation of the agreed upon contract. This probability depends on the expenses x incurred to finance the functioning of an efficient enforcement mechanism. We assume that
With probability 1 − π (x) the regulator is forced to accept a renegotiation. This is modeled using the Nash bargaining solution but assuming that renegotiation is costly (become it takes time say). The status quo payoffs which obtain if the negotiation fails are determined as follows: the firm loses its fixed cost and gets the utility level U 0 = −F . The regulator is also penalized by a loss of reputation and obtains the utility level
We make appropriate assumptions so that the efficient type firm never wants to renege on its contract 10 . Therefore, costly bargaining takes place under complete information, only when β = β. Its outcome solves:
with δ in (0, 1) to model the cost of renegotiation.
It yields the complete information production and effort level q * , e * and the rent level
i.e. the firm and the regulator share equally the social surplus.
Anticipating the outcome of the renegotiation, the regulator modifies ex ante the contract it offers. From now on, we denote by U 1 and U 1 the modified rents once the possibility of renegotiation is taken into account by the regulator.
The sequence of events is now the following. If the firm discovers to be a bad type β, with probability π(x) it faces tough enforcement and carries out the project despite a negative utility. With probability 1 − π(x), it succeeds in forcing a renegotiation. Moreover, when renegotiation happens, we assume that with some (small) positive probability P the parties fail to reach an agreement and the status quo payoffs are implemented.
The resulting probabilities are:
We still need the offer of contracts to be incentive compatible (conditions (11) and (12)) and the new ex ante participation constraint writes 11 :
9 Since the regulator is benevolent H is a function of F , i.e., H = λF +H. If the firm is a foreign firm then H is independent of F and λ in (29) should be replaced by 1 + λ.
10 See footnote 10.
11 Note that the choice of the new levels of rent U 1 and U 1 , which is not unique, must be made in such a way that the efficient type does not want to mimic the bad type and then renegotiate, i.e. s.t.
Substituting the outcome of renegotiation into the regulator's objective function, it becomes
Maximizing this objective function by making the participation constraint binding we obtain:
(
The probability of renegotiation is given by:
where, in the right hand side, the second term, which can be labeled as the government's "tolerance for renegotiation", depends on x E , the investment in enforcement.
What are the main features of the solution above? First, an enforcement mechanism is financed. It is valuable to build an enforcement institution only because the social welfare obtained by the initial contract for β = β is higher than what would result from renegotiation (W q * , e * , β > δW q * , e * , β ), or because renegotiation may fail. This enforcement mechanism is imperfect and its quality is determined by (35). The quality of enforcement decreases (and therefore the probability of renegotiation increases) with the efficiency of ex post bargaining δ.
Note that an increase of the cost of public funds has a different effect on social welfare W (q * , e * , β) depending on the sign of revenue net of cost, i.e.,
It is increasing in λ if revenues exceed cost so that the industry is used as a source of public funds. It is decreasing in λ in the other case. So the net effect of an increase of λ is to decrease enforcement in the second case which holds in general for the water and transportation industries.
12 It is theoretically ambiguous in the other case, which corresponds more to industries like electricity and telecommunications.
12 The effect through P λF can be neglected for P small.
Second, the power of incentives is not intermediary between those which will be obtained with perfect enforcement (high powered) and self-enforcing contracts (low powered). This is because any rent resulting from ex post renegotiation is captured ex ante in the contract offered by the regulator.
Third, if the enforcement mechanism is not very efficient and/or the probability that renegotiation fails is not so small, it could be that the optimal solution obtained above is dominated by self-enforcing contracts. Indeed, the welfare loss with respect to the first best writes now:
where in the right hand side, the first term is the bargaining cost, the second one is the cost linked to the failure of renegotiation, and the third one the enforcement cost.
Comparing ∆W E to ∆W SB obtained in (28), we can determine whether it is worth setting up an (imperfect) enforcement institution rather than relying only on self-enforcing contracts.
Institutional constraints
Institutional constraints in host countries obviously affect the incidence of renegotiation in concession contracts. In what follows, we introduce in different ways these institutional dimensions in the regulatory contract, focusing specifically on politics, corruption and rule of law.
Politics and State Capture
A simple way to model the incidence of political considerations in the occurrence of renegotiations, is to assume that the government is more or less captured by the firm's stakeholders and overweights or underweights the firm's utility in social welfare 13 . Thus, the maximization program consists of a weighted sum of consumers' surplus and the utility of the firm:
where γ may actually be greater than 1. We simply need to assume, for an interior solution to hold, that γ < 1 + λ, so that the regulator always wants to minimize and not maximize the firm's rent. A value of γ higher than 1 is thus the sign that the interests of the firm and the government are more aligned, i.e. of a higher degree of state capture by the firm's stakeholders. A value of γ less than 1 is a sign that the government is partially captured by the non-stakeholders of the firm. In the context of concession contracts, we could conjecture that the presence of local partners in the awarded consortium corresponds to higher values of γ.
Solving the same maximization problem as before, we get a value of U E defined by equation (30), where λ is replaced by 1 + λ − γ. As for x E , it is now given by
What are the effects of an increase in γ, i.e. of a higher degree of state capture on the probability of renegotiation? From (39) it can be seen that it decreases the equilibrium level of enforcement, which implies more renegotiation. When γ increases, the cost of giving up a rent decreases. Suppose first that renegotiation never fails (P = 0). Then this lower cost of the rent has no effect because ex ante contracting enables the regulator to capture this rent. However, if, as we have assumed, politicians do not incur losses when a renegotiation fails, the level of capture does not affect social welfare when renegotiation fails. As γ increases, the cost of the rent (when there is no renegotiation or when renegotiation succeeds) decreases. From the firm's participation constraint, it implies that the social cost of losing the sunk cost F when renegotiation fails decreases as well. It is relatively less costly to provoke renegotiation and therefore the level of enforcement decreases.
In a dynamic framework, changes of the majority may correspond to shifts in the value of γ. In addition, we could expect renegotiations led by new governments when they are composed of more firm's stakeholders 14 than previous governments because they are willing to give up more information rents to regulated firms; and this is possible while still respecting the status quo payoffs induced by contracts offered by majorities with less stakeholders.
Rule of Law or corruption
We come back to the definition of the function π (x), assuming now that it takes the form θπ (x), where the parameter θ stands for the quality of the rule of law or for the level of non-corruption, i.e. of the existing "stock" of institutions.
Coming back to the basic model, equation (35) can now be written:
so that better rule of law or less corruption implies more investment in enforcement.
The direct effect of an increase in θ is thus to decrease the probability of renegotiation, since it decreases the relative cost of enforcing the initial contract. Thus, we expect that in environments characterized by better rule of law or less corruption there will be less renegotiations.
Shocks
A simple way to introduce shocks in our framework is to suppose that the distribution of firm's types is subject to an unanticipated noise, so that upon a shock ε, the probabilities of the enterprise being good or bad become {ν + ε, 1 − ν − ε}. This can be thought of as a shortcut to model a shock affecting either cost or demand of a fraction of the firms.
The probability or renegotiation then becomes:
which decreases as ε increases. This means that positive shocks, such as an increase in demand or a favorable shift in relative prices of inputs or outputs, reduces the probability of renegotiation, while negative shocks (decrease in demand, cost shock) increases the probability of renegotiation.
Outside Financing and Limited Liability
Consider now the case where the firm is protected by limited liability. However, the firm owns assets which can be used as collateral if the firm incurs some debt. The sunk investment has to be made before producing, and financing may take two forms. First, the firm must rely on bank financing but should be guaranteed enough profit to pay back the loan. Second, if private financing is insufficient, the government may finance it. Of course, any combination of these two cases is also possible. Let us introduce the following notations:
A denotes the firm's assets needed for the project.
F is the necessary additional sunk investment.
K is the amount financed by banks' loans (K ∈ [0, F ]), so that K = 0 implies complete government financing, while K = F corresponds to totally private financing. The interest rate on this loan is r.
As the firm has to repay K, its utility level is now:
Moreover, since the bank must be repaid, the firm must have a non negative utility:
This limited liability constraint ensures that the bank is always paid back. To simplify the analysis, we thus consider that the regulator takes this constraint into account in his program and does not include the bank's welfare in social welfare. A further justification is that the bank may be a foreign bank with respect to which default is not affordable.
Since the government finances only F − K, at the cost of public fund λ, the equivalent of (14) becomes:
Note that the level of K will affect the status quo payoff of the government in case of renegotiation. In what follows, we will assume that A < F , so that the firm is able to repay only a share of its debt in case of failure 16 . Two subcases arise. If K < A, the bank gets K and the government gets the remainder A − K that covers part of its investment F − K, leaving a net loss F − A. The status quo payoffs of the firm and the government are respectively:
If K > A, the bank gets only A while the government gets nothing, so it loses F − K. Payoffs are then:
These two cases can be summarized, by noting that the status quo payoffs are:
15 We could specify this limited liability constraint on financial flawst + p(q)q − (β − e)q − (1 + r)K ≥ 0. This would introduce more regimes to consider in the program of the regulator below.
16 Were we to consider the case A > F , the firm's assets would cover the total losses in case of renegotiation failure. The bank would get K and the government F − K,and the status quo payoffs would be (−F, −H), thus being independent of financing.
With the possibility of renegotiation 17 and the disagreement point now given by (43), ex post bargaining yields:
So, private financing costs more than public financing, but it increases the status quo payoff of the regulator and therefore its bargaining power in the renegotiation.
The program becomes then:
s.t.
The binding constraints are the limited liability constraint of the bad type (50) and either the incentive constraint of the good type (47) or the participation constraint (46). These two constraints can be summarized by writing (using the fact that U 1 = 0):
Noticing that now renegotiation happens only if U E ≥ 0, and assuming that P is small, the second term in parenthesis is negative, so only the incentive constraint (47) is binding (U 1 = Φ (e)). Substituting the values of U 1 , U 1 and U E , the objective function 17 Note that we now consider that the bad type wants to renegotiate whenever U E > U 1 ≥ 0. We assume furthermore that we are in a region of parameters where the good type does not find it profitable to mimic the bad type and renegotiate.
becomes:
The effort and output levels of the bad type are now distorted:
The presence of the term π x L at the denominator implies a stronger distortion than the second best ex post contracting level q SB , e SB .
As for the level of enforcement, it is given by:
What is the effect of variations in F and K on the probability of renegotiation? From the denominator of (53), and taking into account the presence of F and K in the expression of W q, e, β it comes that:
This first effect is due to the combined effect that an increase of K increases cost (and therefore decreases the gain from avoiding renegotiation) and improves the regulator's bargaining power and therefore decreases the cost of renegotiation; and for P small enough,
This second effect is also due to the fact that it increases cost. 18 However, since it also decreases the bargaining power of the regulator, a condition on P is needed for the first effect to dominate.
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There is, however, an incentive effect of the limited liability constraint. Indeed, the expected utility of the firm is now positive. Therefore, it has incentives to invest to 18 We have neglected the fact that x L enters (52) so that there is a feedback effect as a decrease of x decreases W q L , e L , β . This reinforces the effect on x. 19 This is true whenever
< 0. This can be rewritten δ < 2 1−P −
1+P
(1−P )(1+λ) , which is always true for P < λ since δ ∈ [0, 1] .
increase its expected profit. Suppose that with expenses i (ν) (i (ν) > 0, i (ν) ≥ 0) the firm increases the probability that β = β. The firm chooses its investment level by solving:
Assuming for simplicity that it does not take into account the impact of its choice on the regulation, we get immediately that:
This means that everything that decreases (resp. increases) the firm's bargaining power and therefore the utility from renegotiation increases (resp. decreases) its incentive for investment and therefore decreases the probability of renegotiation.
For example, from the expression of U E we see that, through this effect, if F increases, the probability of renegotiation increases which reinforces the direct effect, while if K increases, it decreases.
Overall, more investment unambiguously increases the probability of renegotiation, while more private financing has an ambiguous effect.
Regulation, Arbitration and other Contractual Clauses
Concessions contracts sometimes contain specific clauses meant to deal with the potential occurrence of renegotiations, as for example the existence of a formal set of arbitration rules in case of disputes, the existence of a take-over clause and income guarantees.
Arbitration rules are processes which help settle disputes, thereby making renegotiation less costly, i.e. increase δ. We have seen that a increase in δ decreases x E and increases the probability of renegotiation. In this case, we would thus expect the existence of formal arbitration rules (higher δ) to increase the probability of renegotiation. On the other hand, the existence of a regulatory body or more experience in concession contracting at the time of award will decrease the probability of renegotiation due to the more obvious effect of greater expertise in contracting.
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A minimum income guarantee should decrease the desirability of renegotiation by firms but it also decreases the incentives for effort.
A government take-over clause, on the other hand, means that the firm's attempt to renegotiate could be met by the cancellation of the contract and its reallocation to a different concessionaire. In this sense, it increases the bargaining power of the government and can be related to an increase in its status quo level (thus a decrease in its loss of reputation). From (35), a lower H implies less investment in renegotiation and more renegotiations.
Also, the choice of a price cap regulation over a cost plus regulation is ambiguous because on the one hand it creates more risk to the firm and therefore more opportunities for renegotiation, but on the other hand more efficient firms select more easily price cap contracts.
21
However, as discussed above, clauses affecting the outcome of a potential renegotiation should be treated as endogenous. This endogeneity has two dimensions. First there is a direct self-selection effect. For example, take-over clauses are more likely to be introduced in risky projects or when strategic behavior by firms is anticipated. Second, the inclusion of such clauses have a moral hazard effect, in that it may affect the incentive of the firm to behave efficiently. In terms of our model, this second effect amounts to the ex post modification of the type's distribution, whereby a change in the relative bargaining power leads firms to invest to modify the probability to be a good type. In the case of H, we get that:
Thus, as H decreases, this implies a countervailing effect on the probability of renegotiation. Ultimately, determining the qualitative impact of such rules requires to take into account both effects, and is an empirical matter which will be addressed in more detail in Section 3. Table 1 shows the impact of key variables (institutional quality, i.e. rule of law/noncorruption, θ; shock ε; degree of state capture γ; efficiency of bargaining (arbitration) δ; bargaining power H (take-over rules); amount of investment required F ; share of private financing K) on the probability of renegotiation, as well as the expected effects of some additional variables that we did not model explicitly. 
Impact on the Probability of Renegotiation
The Data
We use an original data set, developed by the World Bank, which describes the characteristics of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1982 to 2000 22 .
Considering only concessions for which we know whether they were renegotiated or not as of 2000, and at what date this renegotiation took place, and restricting to the 8 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru) where concessions were granted on a regular basis through the 1990s, we get a sample of 796 concessions, covering the 4 main sectors (telecommunications, energy, transport and water). Table 2 shows the distribution by countries and sectors. The database contains detailed information about the characteristics of these concessions, including general details about the projects (sector, activity, year of award), the award criteria, size and duration of the concession, information with respect to the institutional context and degrees of freedom of the regulator, the type of regulatory framework put in place (price cap, rate of return, etc.), and other details of the concession contract like arbitration clauses, nationality of operators, among others. Appendix 1 presents the full list and definitions of variables used in the analysis below. Table 3 summarizes the frequency of the concessions' key characteristics in our sample which are represented through dummy variables.
Table 3: Characteristics of the concessions
The time structure of the sample is also important. Note also that renegotiations are concentrated in two sectors: 100 concern transportation concessions and 64 correspond to water concessions, while only one telecommunications and no energy project were renegotiated.
To take into account these facts, we build a panel sample by introducing in any given year macroeconomic variables (GDP growth and real exchange rate appreciation 24 ) and a political dummy indicating the occurrence of national elections (presidential or legislative). Lastly, to capture the influence of the broad institutional context, we introduce indices of corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality.
We get an unbalanced rotating panel of 3257 observations, covering 12 years and 796 concessions.
Averaged Panel Analysis
The analysis proceeds in two steps. To get a first idea about the data, we build a simple "averaged" panel. For all countries and all years, each variable referring to concessions' characteristics is represented by the percentage of outstanding concessions sharing some specific characteristic. For example, the value of the price cap variable for Chile in 1998 is the percentage of outstanding concessions regulated by price cap in that country at that time. Variables measuring age of concessions or the previous experience in awarding concessions are represented by the average value: for example, to compute the value of the experience variable for Chile in 1998 we simply average, over the 95 concessions in operation, the variable giving the number of concessions signed prior to the award of each of the outstanding concessions. Finally, economic, political and institutional variables complete the panel. Table 6 shows the results obtained using this "averaged" panel, where the dependent variable is the percentage of outstanding concessions renegotiated in each country and each year. Although some information is lost in the process of averaging to get only one observation per country and per year, interesting insights can still be gained about the causes of renegotiation.
[ Table 6 here]
The regression in column 1, with country fixed effects, includes the basic characteristics of the concessions which we found to have an impact on the probability of renegotiation. The existence of a regulatory body at the time of the concession and the previous experience in awarding concessions reduce the probability of renegotiation and are significant at the 1% level. Several characteristics of the contracts affect also significantly the probability of renegotiation: price cap regulation, exclusive private financing and, the age of the concession increase it. The investment requirements, contrary to theory, decrease it. A more corrupt environment (contrary to theory) reduces the risk of renegotiation, although this last effect is only weakly significant.
In column 2, the degree of independence of the regulator, the level of per capita GDP and the award criteria used are all not significant, and remain so in all the regressions.
Shocks are introduced in columns 3 and 4. Lagged values of GDP growth and real exchange rate depreciation have the expected effect and are generally significant. Indeed, higher growth reduces the probability of renegotiation while exchange rate depreciation increases it. A lagged dummy variable denoting election years is also positive and significant when introduced together with the exchange rate. It is noticeable that the introduction of the shock variables does not perturb essentially the signs and significance of the constitutional and contract characteristics variables.
Finally, in columns 5 to 7 the main regressions are repeated with the inclusion of sector dummies to check the robustness of the results. The significance of corruption, of the experience factor and to a lesser extent of the price cap variable are weakened by this inclusion.
In columns 8 to 10, we run regressions without fixed effects to see to what extent the previous results are driven by the country effects. To compensate, we introduce more variables meant to capture country differences, such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality and per capita GDP. Moreover, without fixed effects there is now a strong positive autocorrelation. To remedy this problem, we introduce the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of our regressions. As for the results, most variables do not change sign, but their significance is reduced, which is not surprising since forcing a common intercept introduces an additional constraint. The interesting result, however, is that the investment requirements variable now show up positive in two out of three specifications. Finally, although corruption remains positive, the other institutional variables (rule of law and bureaucratic quality) are negative.
Let us sum up the most robust results. The existence of a regulator at the time the concessions are awarded and the experience factor show up as strong reducers of subsequent renegotiations. The characteristics of the contract, price cap regulations and duration since award, also affect renegotiation significantly and as expected. Shocks clearly matter as expected. The only robust result which seems to contradict theory is related to the investment requirements. If we interpret investment requirements as F in the model, the results contradict the theory.
Probit Analysis
To take full advantage of the information included in each individual observation, we then run a probit model using the whole panel described above. This allows us to take into account the specific characteristics of each individual concession including, on top of general and regulatory details, particular aspects as the time elapsed since the initial award and the previous experience at the time of award. The output of these regressions is in tables 7 to 10. As might be expected, this second approach yields more satisfactory results. Table 7 shows the impact of the regulatory and institutional environment, as well as the characteristics of the contracts, on the probability of renegotiation. Again, the existence of a regulator has a significant and negative impact, as does the experience factor (number of concessions signed in the country prior to the signing of each particular contract). Concessions regulated by price caps prove more fragile 25 , and so do older contracts. These four variables remain significant under different specifications, and with the inclusion of sector and country dummies, in columns 1 to 9. Furthermore, in columns 2 to 4 and 7 to 9, a quadratic term for the duration since award shows that although older concessions are more prone to renegotiation, the effect reverses after some time (around 5 to 6 years) as only the more robust concessions survive.
[ Table 7 here]
A dummy variable indicating exclusive private financing is now negative and significant in a majority of specifications. More importantly, the existence of investment requirements now has a positive effect, although not always significant.
A more corrupt environment appears now to induce more renegotiations, but the inclusion of sector dummies makes this effect insignificant. Having a look at the distribution of concessions across sectors and countries, it seems probable that sector dummies act as dummies for specific subsets of countries and therefore capture most of the variation in institutional quality across countries 26 . Note also that this is the only apparent divergence between the results of the averaged panel and the probit analysis (with the result on investment). This is probably due to the existence of country effects, as suggested by the results in columns 8-10 of table 6, and by column 6 in table 7, where the inclusion of country dummies make the coefficient of corruption positive.
Other variables we tried yielded no convincing results. These are per capita GDP, the existence of a bidding process, the nature of award criteria, the duration of the concession contract and the existence of a local partner. A dummy variable for the independence of the regulatory body shows up positive in column 2 but the sign is reversed by the inclusion of sector dummies. A variable measuring the frequency of regulatory tariff review is surprisingly negative, but its effect is compensated by a proportional increase in the price cap variable. We exclude it in subsequent specifications because its inclusion strongly reduces the available sample 27 .
On the basis of these results, we retain a basic specification including 7 variables: existence of a regulator, price cap regulation, duration since award and its quadratic term, previous experience, private financing and corruption. In table 8, we combine this basic specification with different types of shocks: growth fluctuations, exchange rate depreciation and elections.
[ Table 8 here]
As for economic shocks, the results are as expected. Fluctuations in the macroeconomic growth rate significantly affect the occurrence of renegotiation, i.e. recessions increase it while booms reduce it. Contemporary and lagged values (up to t-2) of the growth rate are negative and significant at the 1% level in columns 1,3,5,6,8 and 10. Moreover, this effect complements rather that substitutes for that of the characteristics discussed before. A similar picture can be drawn for exchange rate depreciation, although in this case a significant effect only occurs for lagged variables. Finally, the probability of renegotiation appears to increase in years following national, legislative or presidential, elections.
In columns 4 and 9 of table 7, we introduce three contract characteristics (minimum income guarantee, arbitration process and government take-over clause) that we believe must be treated as endogenous to the risk of renegotiation. Their direct effect is unclear: the first two (income guarantee and arbitration) change sign and the third one (take-over clause) is positive but only significant when sector dummies are present.
In table 8, columns 3,4,8 and 9, we get similar effects: minimum income guarantee changes sign, while arbitration process and government take-over are respectively negative and positive, but only significant with sector dummies included.
These variables refer to clauses in the concession contract which are likely to be introduced or not according to the risk of renegotiation perceived ex ante and are thus endogenous to the type and the riskiness of the projects undertaken. This highlights the need to address the broader issue of contract endogeneity.
Addressing contract endogeneity
The endogeneity of contracts' clauses has two dimensions. First, there is an ex ante self-selection problem, in that the contracting parties would select specific clauses, type of regulation and financing according to their (sometimes unobservable) characteristics. For example, the inclusion of specific arbitrage rules and take-over provisions could be induced by the government's fear of strategic renegotiations when facing a firm with high perceived renegotiation skills. Conversely, minimum income guarantee would be included as a mean to make risky concessions attractive to private agents. A similar problem applies to the type of tariff regulation chosen. A self-selection effect would suggest that more efficient firms would prefer price cap regulation, which is more risky but would allow these firms to get higher rents, but may also lead to think that riskier projects would be regulated by lower-powered (cost plus) schemes. Finally, the type of financing which prevails cannot be considered as exogenous either, since private operators would be more willing to finance projects which appear as less risky and/or more profitable.
Second, there is an ex post moral hazard problem (the effect on the ν variable in our model), due to the fact that once the contract has been signed, the firm and the government would act strategically given the nature of this contract. Facing the threat of contract's termination, firms might be induced to behave more efficiently or to avoid provoking strategic renegotiations. Conversely, when protected by minimum income guarantee, they might make less efforts. Price caps or private financing can also be expected to have incentive effects on the behavior of firms.
The problem we intend to tackle is to disentangle these two dimensions, in order to assess the real incentive effect of each specific aspect of the contract. More precisely, we use a two stage proceeding aimed at controlling the self-selection effect of each of the variables suspected to be endogenous.
To do this, we need to find suitable instruments. We take as instruments: sectors, corruption, bureaucracy quality, rule of law, existence of regulatory body, independence of regulatory body which are obviously exogenous. We run probit estimates of the five variables we want to instrument, using the static sample of the 796 concessions. Note that these first stage regressions are fairly satisfactory (see Appendix 2). We then take the predicted values of each of these variables and reintroduce them in the probit panel. Finally, we estimate the equations with these instrumented variables. The results are in tables 9 and 10.
[ Table 9 here]
The price cap variable remains positive and significant once instrumented. Thus, despite the potential self-selection effect, the higher riskiness of price caps still leads to more renegotiation of the concessions under this regulatory scheme. Moreover, its coefficient becomes stronger, which seems to confirm the bias of the actual sample of price cap schemes toward less risky projects.
Concessions financed exclusively by the private sector are renegotiated less often and the effect remains after instrumenting it. Thus, on top of the self-selection effect, the prevalence of private finance appears to have a clear positive incentive effect.
The instrumented minimum income guarantee variable is positive and significant at the 1% level.
28 In this case, it seems that, even taking into account the self-selection effect of riskier concessions, this kind of clause fails to reduce renegotiation. This tends to confirm the inappropriateness of such provision (see for example Engel et alii, 2000) The instrumented arbitration process variable is significantly positive as suggested by the theory. Government take-over clauses have a non significant impact once instrumented.
[ Table 10 here]
Relation to theoretical results
The empirical results presented above are broadly consistent with our theoretical model. We had first the prediction that better institutional quality (both through our θ variable, representing rule of law or non-corruption, and through the quality of the bureaucracy) should imply less renegotiations. This is indeed the case as the coefficients of the institutional variables are generally negative and significant 29 .
Political cycles have a positive effect, in that post-election years witness more renegotiations. This result can be related to the effect of the degree of state capture γ. Under this approach, it means that, as governments closer to the firms access to power, they are likely to tolerate more renegotiations.
As anticipated, shocks have the expected effect and are significant determinants of the probability of renegotiation.
Relating the existence of arbitration rules to the cost of bargaining, the empirical results are consistent with our model, in that these rules increase the occurrence of renegotiation.
The prediction with respect to investment, which we expected to have a positive effect on the probability of renegotiation, is broadly confirmed by the probit analysis.
28 However, the introduction of this variable makes in general price cap and institutional variables non significant.
29 See Table 9 .
For private financing, the model yielded ambiguous prediction due to the moral hazard effect through the impact on the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties. The empirical results show that the dominant effect is negative.
Finally, for the other variables not modeled explicitly, as anticipated we get negative effects for the existence of a regulator and of previous experience, while income guarantees and price cap regulation have positive effects.
Conclusion: Policy Implications
We now discuss in some more details the principal results, in particular with regards to their practical policy implications. Table 11 presents estimations of the marginal effects of the main variables found to be robustly significant. For continuous variables, the marginal effects are computed by comparing the predicted probability of a positive outcome when each variable varies by a small amount (10 −6 ). For dummy variables, two values are computed, corresponding to the two subsets {X = 1} and {X = 0}. The values thus indicate the average variation in the probability of renegotiation which would result if all the observations in the subset would shift from 1 (resp. 0) to 0 (resp. 1). The subsample size is indicated in parenthesis. The average of the predicted probabilities of renegotiation is 4.58%.
[ Table 11 here]
Regulatory environment, experience and contracts' incompleteness.
The first feature of the environment having an impact on the probability of renegotiation is the existence of a regulatory body at the time the concession was awarded. This aspect significantly reduces the occurrence of subsequent renegotiations, as can be seen both from the averaged panel and the random probit panel, where the coefficient of this variable is systematically negative and significant at the 1% level. The effect remains unaltered when controlling for the whole range of characteristics, shocks, as well as with sector and country dummies. Moreover, the corresponding marginal effect is very strong, as it ranges from 14 to more than 18%. The first line of Table 11 should be read as follows: If all the concessions designed with a regulatory body did not have such a regulator, the average predicted probability (of this subsample) which is 2.21% would increase to 16.46%.
The pre-existence of a regulator in the field where a concession is awarded can first be related to the simple fact that a better designed regulation from the start will reduce the scope for obvious mistakes and lessen the need for later disruptive modifications. Instead, it can be expected that contingencies occurring during the life of the project could be dealt with through a normal revision process inside the existing regulatory framework.
Moreover, this aspect can be related to the deeper issue of contract incompleteness. It is sometimes argued that concession contracts should be made as complete as possible, i.e. trying to include every possible contingency to avoid leaving room for ex post renegotiations 30 . However, there are limits to this approach. First, in a very complex world describing infinite contingencies might prove impossible, and so contracts are bound to be incomplete. Second, imperfect enforcement limit the effectiveness of these contracts. Finally, complex contracts might be counter-productive if they lack transparency, contain contradictory requirements and lend themselves to opportunistic revision claims. These problems favor an alternative approach which relies on short concession-specific documents, while general rules regarding concessions would be found in laws and the relevant jurisprudence. With this type of contract, previous experience in dealing with the design of concessions should have an important role in limiting the risk of later renegotiations, and this is precisely what we should expect from a specialized and experienced regulator 31 .
Finally, a related aspect is the degree of independence of the regulatory body. Our results give little support to the idea that an independent regulator is crucial in limiting renegotiations. In the specifications tested, the sign of the corresponding dummy variable is unstable and not always significant. This lack of robustness might be linked to the fact that the independence of regulators in Latin America is still the exception rather than the rule (only 25% of our sample concessions have an independent regulator) and that it is difficult to measure actual independence, so that no clear effect on that dimension can be observed at that time.
Type of regulation
The impact of the different regulatory schemes on the probability of renegotiation can be observed through the price cap variable, which shows up positive and significant in almost all the specifications tested. This effect remains when instrumenting this variable to try to take into account the self-selection problem. Thus, price cap schemes are conducive to more renegotiations and this effect is likely to be due to their greater riskiness and fragility to shocks. As for their marginal effect, direct estimations suggest it is limited (between 1.3% and 3.3%), but instrumental regressions give rise to higher coefficients. This is important, since 75% of the concessions in the Latin America are regulated by price caps, and the region is characterized by a rather volatile economic environment.
30 See the example of the Buenos Aires water concession, running hundreds of pages and several volumes, mentioned in Klein (1998) . 31 The variable capturing previous country experience in awarding concessions is also negative and significant throughout, which tends to confirm this idea.
This result is also important to point out the need to take into account this weakness of price cap regulation when dealing with developing countries. Moreover, remedies like minimum income guarantee clauses seem to be ineffective in taming the impact of risk.
Shocks, investment, financing, and specific clauses.
If, on top of basic performance requirements (service and quality) and price regulation, concession contracts include investment requirements, they may end up being more sensitive to fluctuations in firm's productivity, shocks and wrong demand forecasts 32 . The positive effect of the investment variable in table 7 is thus not a surprise. However, investment is generally not a choice variable, and concessions are likely to be awarded precisely because the state is unable or unwilling to assume important infrastructure investments. This points out to the effect of several related variables, which should compensate for this increased fragility: private financing and minimum income guarantee.
Exclusive private financing proves to reduce significantly the occurrence of renegotiation. Our results, both from standard and two stage regressions, point out to a positive incentive effect of the financial structure on the behavior of concessions' holders. The marginal effect is important, as it ranges from 4 to almost 12% for simple regressions.
Minimum income guarantees do in principle protect holders of concession contract against shocks and other unforeseen contingencies. However, the empirical analysis does not support this conclusion, and leads to think that such guarantees instead increase the probability of renegotiation by reducing incentives to behave efficiently and/or fostering strategic underbidding, as well as by making possible the realization of projects with negative social value.
Politics
Political cycles are likely to have consequences on the occurrence of renegotiations. As our theoretical model suggests, the government's willingness to accept renegotiation of concessions contracts might depend crucially on the extent to which its interests are aligned with those of the firm. Our empirical analysis shows that in years following national elections, the probability of renegotiation increases significantly (by about 1.5%), even after controlling for the economic cycle. This is a first indication of the importance of political considerations.
A more detailed analysis of this aspect would need to consider the nature of political 32 In the transport sector, Engel et al. (2001) mention demand forecasts for the Washington D.C. Dulles Airport-Leesburg, Va. toll road, which were overestimated more than fourfold by two consulting companies. Argentine's freight railways concession included investment requirements that prove excessive in view of the ulterior market development (Klein, 1998) . Chilean tolled roads experienced huge demand fluctuations during the 1986-1995 period (Engel et al., 2000) .
changes. In particular, asymmetries might appear depending on whether the previous government cares more or less for the rents of the firm than its successor 33 . Finally, interactions between the nature of government and institutional characteristics like corruption might also be relevant.
33 See Aubert and Laffont (2002) .
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